Once More, with Feeling: Design Thinking and Embodied Cognition by Lindgaard, Karin & Wesselius, Heico
83
Keywords
Design thinking
Embodied cognition
Metaphor
Visual thinking
Felt sense 
Received March 24, 2017 
Accepted May 1, 2017 
Emails 
Karin Lindgaard 
(corresponding author) 
karin.lindgaard@gmail.com
Heico Wesselius 
hwesselius@swin.edu.au
Once More, with Feeling:  
Design Thinking and Embodied 
Cognition
Karin Lindgaard, Swinburne University of Technology, Australia
Heico Wesselius, Swinburne University of Technology, Australia
Abstract While leaders in business and industry maintain their interest 
in design thinking, academic discussions of the concept have become less 
common. This article examines design thinking in relation to develop-
ments in cognitive science and embodied cognition. We examine an influ-
ential theory of metaphor as central to cognition, along with theoretical 
nuances of the body, perception, and feeling. We argue that some material 
design practices may augment the creative process. We propose a broad 
interdisciplinary account for the role that feeling plays in design and cogni-
tion both.
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The fate of design thinking is unclear, and its present status uncertain. Some ad-
vocates for design thinking have distanced themselves from the concept.1 Others 
continue to celebrate its achievements and possibilities. In a 2015 cover feature 
article for the Harvard Business Review, Jon Kolko maintains that design thinking has 
“come of age.”2 In that issue, Tim Brown, Roger Martin, and Kolko—all well-known 
proponents of design thinking—trace the expansion of the concept from the realm 
of product design to broader spheres and more complex problems.3 By contrast, 
there are fewer academic discussions of design thinking. Some researchers argue 
against the notion of design thinking as a “panacea for the economy”4 and some 
discussions of innovation now avoid the term. Moreover, certain methods of design 
thinking used in business and management—engaging with users and iterative 
prototyping, for example—appear to support incremental innovation rather than 
radical product innovation.5
Many argue that the concept of design thinking is “not well understood, either 
by the public or those who claim to practice it”6 and it lacks “sustained develop-
ment”7 in the academic literature. These authors describe differences between 
academic definitions and those used in industry. They schematize these differences, 
suggesting ways to better develop the concept.
Some definitions of design thinking in academia and industry are related. 
Johansson and Woodilla find a substantial parallel increase in academic and in-
dustry publications during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Both peak in 
2009.8 Nonetheless, work on design thinking in industry pays little attention to the 
academic history of design thinking. Its development began during the Conference 
on Design Methods in 1962, and it includes an extensive trajectory of research since 
the still-current Design Thinking Research Symposium began in 1991.9
However, academic work with the concept is not unified. Ulla Johansson-
Sköldberg, Jill Woodilla, and Mehyes Çetinkaya identify five sub-discourses, 
each with “clear roots and a substantial academic following”10 within academic 
discourse. They use the umbrella term designerly thinking for these. They reserve the 
term design thinking for the three identifiable management discourses. Lucy Kimbell, 
who maintains that “design remains a fragmented discipline,”11 schematizes 
three ways of describing design thinking: as a cognitive style, as a general theory 
of design, and as an organizational resource. Business and managerial discourse 
includes the last of these. According to all these authors, the notions of design 
thinking prevalent in business and management are based on anecdotal evidence 
rather than on robust theory.
Despite the convoluted design thinking discourse, these authors suggest 
further research into the concept of design thinking, along with a search for 
clarity. Kimbell recommends a shift in focus toward “situated, embodied material 
practices”12 within a broader interdisciplinary context. She acknowledges the 
cultural and social position of designers—and recognizes their limits. As one 
of three suggestions for future research, Johansson-Sköldberg, Woodilla, and 
Çetinkaya propose linking popular design thinking discourses from the innovation 
domain with the designerly view of meaning creation. They warn that “the design 
thinking discourse will most probably die if it does not acquire a scholarly base 
that relates more to designerly thinking.”13
This article is a contribution to the “critical rethinking”14 of design thinking. 
While we do not pursue the research directions that these authors propose, our 
direction aligns with their approach. We explore how material design practices may 
contribute to the innovation process by relating these competencies to a theory of 
meaning making that we adapt from cognitive science. We attempt to link design 
practices from the popular design thinking discourse—sketching and prototyping, 
for example—with a theory that explains how understanding emerges and relates 
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to experience. The concepts in this article fit broadly within the discourse of design 
thinking as a cognitive style. In relation to the academic discourses identified by 
Johansson-Sköldberg, Woodilla, and Çetinkaya, this article offers a perspective 
on cognition that may help to develop the discourse of “design and designerly 
thinking as a reflexive practice”15 developed from the work of Donald A. Schön.16 
While this article explores perspectives on individual cognition, it does not 
assert that designers have special cognitive capabilities. Rather, it is an attempt to 
shed light on how the designer’s ability to capture whole concepts or perspectives 
in the form of prototypes and sketches supports the creative thinking of the people 
who engage with them—whether or not they are designers. In this way, we explain 
designers’ contribution to the collaborative innovation process. This article is an at-
tempt to outline developments in cognitive science that may interest designers and 
design theorists as they consider design thinking. Interdisciplinary in its approach, 
this article is suggestive rather than definitive, offering a perspective that may lead 
to future theoretical and empirical exploration.
A Theory of Metaphor
In this article, we draw on the stream of cognitive science grounded in a theory 
of metaphor. We outline this theory, along with the changes it has undergone, in 
a way that will help to make sense of design thinking in the broader history of 
design. The changes center on the roles of the body and feeling in cognition and 
understanding. 
Cognitive science began with theoretical models of cognitivism established 
in the 1950s and developed over the following decades. These theoretical models 
primarily described cognition as the manipulation of abstract, amodal symbols in 
the brain, symbols that exist separately from sense perception. This theory relied 
heavily on the metaphor of computation, an extension of the confidence in the 
ability of analytic logic and mathematics to represent and solve problems.17 Her-
bert Simon’s Science of Design is one of the earliest key works in the history of design 
thinking. It epitomizes this approach to problem-solving, relying on a metaphor of 
the mind as a “disembodied information processor.”18 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By, published in 1980, 
brought metaphor into the field of cognitive science. Their theory unsettled the 
notion that abstract concepts exist separately in the mind. Instead, they argued 
that metaphors structure our experience and our understanding. Essentially, we 
use certain aspects of our experience to organize our understanding of phenomena 
that are less clear to us. In so doing, we organize our actual experience of those 
phenomena. Metaphors serve to highlight or conceal aspects of phenomena in ways 
that make both our understanding and our experience deeply interpretive. This 
approach emerged in discussions of linguistic evidence.19 More recently, it has 
drawn upon neuroscience and psychological studies of consciousness.20
We understand and experience some things in terms of other phenomena 
that we understand more naturally or directly. This leads us to ask how that more 
clear or basic understanding develops, which leads directly to the concept of 
embodiment. Johnson addressed this with the concept of “image schemata”21—
gestalt and analogue modes of understanding that we develop through physical 
interaction with the world. For instance, our understanding of various types 
of physical force develops through interactions with objects. We then use this 
understanding to form abstract concepts by projecting our understanding to other 
domains. For example, reaching and grasping are basic physical movements and 
abilities that we develop very early on in our lives. Our experiences seeking and 
holding physical objects provide us with basic, gestalt modes—holistic patterns—of 
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understanding. These patterns are then metaphorically projected onto phenomena 
other than physical objects, such as ideas. Projection enables us to understand 
them and speak about them. Thus, we grasp a concept, we get it, but we might hold 
on too tightly to it, or even drop a line of argument. Our physical experiences with 
real objects in everyday life form some of our basic cognitive concepts. We then use 
these concepts metaphorically to understand and communicate with others about 
experiences that are more diffuse. 
Embodied Cognition
Engagement with the notion of embodiment characterizes a broader movement 
in cognitive science beyond the stream that explicitly theorizes metaphor. It is 
helpful to contextualize the discussion so far in relation to this field, particularly 
with regard to theories of perception and feeling. This emerging field has been 
variously termed “post-cognitivism,”22 “second-generation cognitive science,”23 
and “embodied cognition.”24 While it is by no means a cohesive field, it may 
be described as generally concerned with “a view of cognition as interactive, 
embodied, and embedded.”25 Given that cognitive science is an interdisciplinary 
field, embodied cognition involves researchers from psychology, neuroscience, 
philosophy, linguistics, and Artificial Intelligence. Although the focus can vary 
markedly amongst different researchers, a general concern is to understand how 
processes of brain and mind, which were previously considered abstract and 
separate from bodily processes of feeling, movement and perception, actually rely 
upon and develop from those very processes. In this view, human meaning and 
understanding depend on bodily experience, and they depend on evolutionary and 
developmental processes.
Many developments in embodied cognition theory focus on how processes that 
we usually consider to be basic level perceptions generate abstract concepts. One 
area that has received sustained attention is the role that sensory and motor areas 
of the brain play in cognition, which is investigated using neuroimaging while 
people perform various cognitive tasks. Mahon and Caramazza summarize the 
general findings: 
“The empirical evidence is not in dispute. We assume three empirical general-
izations to be true: the motor system is automatically activated when partici-
pants (a) observe manipulable objects; (b) process linguistic stimuli (e.g., action 
verbs) the meanings of which imply bodily action; and (c) observe the actions 
of another individual.”26
Put simply, understanding words or objects associated with activity employs areas 
of the brain that direct bodily movement in that individual. This activates brain 
areas that govern physical activity in situations in which a person is not moving or 
preparing for movement. One possible explanation is that this process contributes 
to understanding. Different theories in embodied cognitive science extrapolate 
differently from this evidence, often relying on a notion of simulation. They pro-
pose that the observation of an object or the understanding and use of language 
involves—or indeed is—the unconscious simulation of interactions or activity. 
Some theories see this process as confined to the brain, as a mental simulation.27 
However, views are converging increasingly on the notion that actual simulation in 
the body occurs, such as the muscles being poised for activity, 28 and there is some 
evidence for this claim. 
Some researchers suggest a distinction between “shallow” and “deep” 
processing.29 They suggest that the level of simulation may relate to degrees of 
ambiguity or uncertainty in a situation. This suggests that when some thing or 
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phenomenon is more difficult to understand, simulation is more likely to involve 
the body.  
Despite areas of overlap, a basic distinction seems to remain between theories 
that see sensory and motor perception as discrete forms of information that are 
brought together and projected in the formation of concepts, and those that see 
sensory and motor perception as initially gestalt. The latter refers to evidence that 
some neurons in the brain do not—at a basic level—distinguish between different 
forms of sensory information about an object or a situation, such as the way an 
object looks, the way it feels in your hand, and the motor movements associated 
with engaging with the object.30 That some neurons function in this way implies 
that our most basic and general perceptions emerge from interactions, and all 
of this information is brought to bear even when simply looking at an object. 
This relates to the notion of affordances, often mentioned in the field of design.31 
Johnson describes visual perception as follows
“When you see a cup sitting on the table in front of you, you are not just 
having a visual experience. In addition to the activation of neuronal clusters in 
parts of your visual cortices, you are experiencing that cup as something that 
you could reach for, grasp, pick up, and raise to your lips to quench your thirst. 
The cup affords not just a visual form; it also affords pick-up-ability.”32
Visual Thinking
In his work on visual thinking, art historian Rudolf Arnheim prefigured the view 
that perception and cognition are similar processes. He states that perception is 
“not a mechanical recording but the active grasping of structural features.”33 For 
Arnheim, visual perception inherently involves categorization. In some uncertain 
situations, it may involve a metaphorical projection of categories. Arnheim argues 
that we perceive gestalts and then discriminate further. He states that all levels of 
cognition involve abstraction—in the sense of perceiving generalities—and he sees 
visual perception as a mental operation, and therefore a cognitive process.
“High generality is a quality of perception from the very start. It is a generality 
brought about by primary abstraction, in the sense that the differences which 
it hides are well above the threshold of the sense of sight. Details accessible to 
the eyes are not yet differentiated by the mind.”34
Arnheim gives vision priority as a medium for thinking because of its high level of 
detail and variety—“it offers structural equivalents to all characteristics of objects, 
events, relations.”35 Learning to see and understand, then, comes from attending to 
particulars, and making increasingly fine perceptual distinctions. Even the highest 
level of theorizing relies on engaging with the world, rather than on progressively 
withdrawing from the world as traditional notions of abstract thinking suggest. In 
this way, Arnheim sees similarities between the practice of art and the practice of 
science. 
Arnheim’s work on visual thinking is a precursor in the design field to later 
developments in embodied cognition. For instance, one can describe the develop-
ment of image schemata through physical interaction in an environment36 as the 
development of visual-spatial understanding. However, even when we conceptu-
alize gestalt modes of understanding as developing through interactive, physical 
processes, rather than perception alone, the role of qualitative experience—
feeling—remains unaccounted for.
Johnson explores this problem in recent work,37 and it is a burgeoning theme 
across the field of embodied cognition. 
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Feeling as a “Sense of Fit”
Some research in the field of embodied cognition studies the relationship between 
emotion and cognition.38 However, much of the field focuses on processes that 
would normally be considered perceptual—the sensory and motor as perceptions of 
the body—rather than the overall feeling of bodily movement in a situation.39 This 
may be a tendency within the field of cognitive science generally—the notion of 
cognition does not traditionally include emotion or motivation.40 However, feeling 
and emotion are central to recent developments in neuroscience, which are in turn 
aligned with the field of embodied cognition. 
Prominent neuroscientific theories of emotion offer perspectives on the rela-
tionship between emotion and so-called “reason.”41 Rather than treating emotion 
as separate from rational or higher order thinking, this approach identifies emo-
tion with unconscious processes that guide complex forms of behavior. Feeling 
is the most basic level of conscious experience that may or may not emerge as a 
result, and abstract thinking relies on all of these processes. While this characteri-
zation represents a simplification of body-brain functioning, it is easiest to under-
stand these different processes as levels in hierarchical relation. Thus, one might 
describe lower level processes42 that precede consciousness as being the impetus 
to act, which we can outwardly observe—at times—as emotion. Depending on 
the overall situation and how it constrains an individual’s current needs, feeling 
emerges—initially as the sense of how well an action might meet the demands pre-
sented by the situation. This is feeling a “sense of fit.”43 These lower level processes 
and our feeling experiences then set the tone for more differentiated perceptions, 
including the use of abstract concepts and logical thinking. We have already seen 
that abstract concepts are metaphors that rely on understanding developed over 
time as an individual interacts with a given environment. Thus, if we understand 
feeling—as the most basic level of consciousness, and thus a whole body experi-
ence—in terms of the simulations that precede perception, then it is possible that 
feeling emerges as the gestalt experience of simulating past relevant situations in 
the present. Feeling itself may be understood as metaphor, developed over a life-
time of understanding situations as similar. 
Eugene Gendlin’s work supports this view. He also characterizes understanding 
as involving the whole body, rather than as being built up from separate sense per-
ceptions. He says that “We act from the bodily sense of each situation.”44 Gendlin 
describes the role of feeling in meaning making by pointing to our “felt sense”45 of 
a situation. This felt sense is always present, even if we are not actively attending 
to it. It is the implicit, nonverbal aspect of our experience; a gestalt experience, but 
one that is also precise. Cognition has two sides—this felt sense, and symbols. Sym-
bols are explicit expressions, such as language or images. Gendlin defines meaning 
in terms of the functional relationships between these two sides. “The felt meaning 
functions … to select the further symbols that explicate it.”46 This is how we have a 
sense of what to say next, or how to proceed in any situation. Often we only know 
that something is missing or not right, and as we attend to this feeling, we consider 
alternatives. Our knowing when something is not right or not finished, even if 
we do not know why, is one of the most tangible ways of noticing our felt sense. 
Then, as we think of alternative solutions or scenarios, we also know exactly when 
we have found the right one. Meaning making, even in the most mundane sense, 
always has these two sides. These two sides of a single activity depend on each 
other. Cognition occurs as a dialectic between feeling, which is implicit and gestalt, 
and symbol, which is explicit and differentiated. We switch our attention between 
the gestalt and the particular.
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Cognition and Design Activity
One can apply this understanding of cognition to the internal process of a 
single designer or the collective process of a collaborative group. The cyclical, 
iterative process of designing is one of attending between the gestalt and the 
particular, always guided by a feeling for a goal. As with any human activity, the 
design process is constantly evaluative. A designer’s felt sense of a solution and 
exploration of the details of that solution may be a process of having a structural 
pattern in mind—a metaphor—and then attempting its application. The overall fit 
of the metaphor unfolds. Kees Dorst’s concept of frame creation resonates with this 
description of the design process.
“New approaches to the problem situation can then be created through a 
subtle process of inference: once commonalities in themes have been identi-
fied, comparisons can be drawn, often through metaphor, to situations outside 
of the problem domain in which these themes are realized.”47
Some studies of design activity also point to such processes. Gabriela Goldschmidt, 
who also draws on Arnheim’s work, describes the role of sketching in an iterative 
process of discovery and reflection. She terms this the “dialectics of sketching.”48 
Goldschmidt defines the dialectic as a movement between “seeing as” and “seeing 
that.”49 “Seeing as” describes a gestalt perception through metaphor and “seeing 
that” describes the exploration of a particular implication of the metaphor to the 
task at hand. It is important to note that Goldschmidt does not see the process of 
creative thinking as specific to design, or specific to the arts.
“The use of physical metaphors in all disciplines entails ‘seeing as’ and in 
design, in science, and in art there are many examples of metaphors which 
led to new developments and important innovations, discoveries, and 
inventions.”50
Goldschmidt proposes that sketching supports the organization of visual thinking 
into the dialectical pattern. This may be because sketches offer specific details. 
Externalizations are far more distinct than mental images. Ilse Verstijnen and her 
colleagues also claim that “the crucial aspect of sketching conditions … appears to 
be the possibility to perceive new structure in externalizations of mental images.”51 
However, we have questioned the separateness of visual information. We propose 
that externalization supports the deeper forms of simulation we use to test the 
aptness of metaphors in novel situations. Externalizations such as sketches and 
prototypes support the conscious comparison and projection of structural relationships. 
But they also support the unconscious, embodied simulation of structural relations. This 
simulation emerges in consciousness as the feeling we get for the appropriateness 
of any solution to any problem—the gestalt sense of fit that we rely upon, some-
times even with explicit awareness. We suggest that sketches and prototypes assist 
the dialectical process of creative discovery in collaborative situations because they 
are analogue representations of gestalt concepts. They contain the implicit in their 
precise, yet unfinished, nature. A designer’s ability to capture the implicit in an an-
alogue representation relies on the skills gained in practice-based design training.
Our interpretation of design practice does not diminish the importance of 
design research for embodied cognition. An understanding of design processes can 
contribute to conceptions of human cognition. For example, Goldschmidt’s dialogic 
process of “seeing as” and “seeing that,” emerging from protocol studies, is one way 
of describing generative cognition that supports and extends theories of metaphor 
and embodiment. Studies of the use of analogy52 and reinterpretation53 in design 
present similar themes, including further work by Goldschmidt.54 There is debate 
amongst theorists of metaphor and analogy over the kind of cognitive process that 
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each describes,55 but we argue that analogy to pertains more to conscious processes 
of comparison and metaphor to unconscious projection, a literal “seeing as.” Thus, 
it makes perfect sense that forming analogies may be central to the generation of 
possible solutions and novel perspectives. But those that hold—that provide solu-
tions that we sense as fitting—are used as metaphors. These metaphors entail the 
structure that we project from them. The details of a solution are as much discov-
ered as created.
The Problem of Feeling for the Field of Design
It is worth clarifying the trajectory of the development of design thinking. Initially, 
its development was similar to that of cognitive science—both fields embraced a 
cognitivist approach, and then questioned that approach. In the academic field 
of design, a period of increased confidence in a rational and scientific basis for 
design was followed by an acknowledgement of the limitations of this basis. 
Design activity in a social or cultural context is more complex than such models 
explain. However, the field of design still needed to distance itself from the notion 
that design is intuitive or creative—and therefore unable to be theorized. Design 
researchers developed a view of design as a form of plan-making or problem-
structuring, often through rational and deliberative processes. Thus, second-
generation design methods remain focused upon reasoning,56 and critiques of the 
rational problem-solving paradigm have not led to genuine alternatives.57
While the stream of cognitive science we describe has developed theories of 
embodiment and feeling, design theorists may remain uncomfortable with these 
developments because of the struggle for design to be recognized as an academic 
discipline. As Huppatz says, “For design research and education, Simon’s ‘science 
of design’—with its focus on problem solving—remains appealing as an opposing 
model to a ‘crafts’-oriented image of the designer.”58 
Ambivalence towards the role that feeling plays in thinking may be one source 
of the ambiguity of design thinking. Kolko explains that design thinking tran-
scends the historical view of designers as “artistic savants.”59 On the other hand, 
Brown speaks about designers as basically “feeling their way through” the process 
of design.60 This, in turn, is at odds with Huppatz, who says, 
“[The] promise of greater control has proven popular in recent characteriza-
tions of design thinking closely aligned to management. The logic of optimiza-
tion promises greater predictability and profit while rigorously stripping judg-
ment, intuition, and experience from systems and service design.”61
Even so, some industry-based versions of design thinking do place emphasis on 
emotion—that of users or customers. This emphasis is on empathy, or concern for 
the emotions elicited in the user or customer, and not on the emotions elicited 
during the process of designing. As Kimbell explains, the designer appears to be 
rather uncritically accepted as able to understand users and interpret their needs, 
in a process that “shows little of the reflexivity of the social science traditions.”62
Some moves in design theory align with the view presented in this paper. 
Tonkinwise, for instance, rightly points out that managerial versions of design 
thinking downplay—and at times completely exclude—the role of aesthetics in 
design. This, he argues, fails to acknowledge the role of style. Tonkinwise defines 
style as “the ground of a practice, that which coordinates actions and makes them 
meaningfully part of a practice”63—including the link between innovation and 
stylistic discernment learned as part of a practice-based design education. The 
“felt sense” or “feeling for” described in this paper is central to aesthetic practice 
and reproduction. Indeed, more recent work by Johnson extends earlier work on 
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metaphor and image schemata, exploring meaning, feeling, and their relationship 
to art and aesthetics.64 More broadly, the philosophy of aesthetics and the body has 
become a major theme, generating an interdisciplinary field termed somaesthetics, 
which “redirects aesthetics back to the core issues of perception, consciousness and 
feeling” and provides “an exploratory orientation for new research in philosophy of 
mind”65 through aesthetic inquiry.
Concluding Remarks
This article has explained some key developments in cognitive science towards 
embodied cognition. We considered the contribution of material design practices 
to creative thinking and innovation in the context of these developments. The 
stream of cognitive science we discussed is heavily influenced by theories of 
the role of metaphor in the generation of experience and understanding. Some 
cognitive scientists have developed these theories in relation to empirical and 
theoretical research on the body, perception, and feeling. We made attempts to link 
existing design concepts—such as affordances and visual thinking—to this broader 
narrative. We also showed how specific studies in design align with the notion that 
applying and exploring metaphors occurs as a dialectical style of thinking between 
the gestalt and the particular. Explicit moves always occur in relation to an 
implicit “sense of fit” or “feeling for” a solution. Material design practices such as 
sketching and prototyping may assist this “feeling for,” particularly in collaborative 
situations. Thus, we have situated one aspect of design thinking within broader 
theories so as to clarify some potential contributions of design to both theory and 
practice.
We offered theoretical perspectives in the context of a trajectory of develop-
ment. We aimed to demonstrate how the trajectory of design thinking differed 
from that of cognitive science. Our purpose was to highlight the ambivalence that 
design theorists may have towards the role of feeling in design and cognition. 
Ironically, paying more attention to the role of feeling in cognition counters the 
notion of designers as “artistic savants,” although in a different manner than that 
of industry advocates for design thinking. Our perspective does not privilege the 
creativity of the designer, but not because we change the definition of design ac-
tivity. Rather, we situate design in a theory base that acknowledges the profound 
creativity of the processes underlying ordinary human cognition. These processes 
may be augmented by specific practices, including design practices.
We provided an account of one stream of embodied cognition that may be 
of interest to a broad audience that already has some interest in design thinking. 
However, our description of the differing theoretical trajectories is in some respects 
a simplified account. Although much research on embodiment exists in the field 
of Human Computer Interaction (HCI), it would require a lengthy review in light 
of the ideas presented in this article. We chose to foreground the area of design 
theory from which academic concepts of design thinking emerged. This field has 
developed largely in design departments with a tradition of practice-based training.
Developments towards embodiment within HCI have taken a different trajec-
tory, more inspired by the philosophical tradition of phenomenology. Many authors 
cite Paul Dourish’s 2001 work Where the Action Is as a classic that solidified embodied 
interaction as a key theme in HCI.66 Some researchers propose embodiment as a 
“third paradigm” successor to other approaches in HCI.67 Yet embodiment remains 
a plural concept in HCI, characterized by a variety of terms and definitions.68
Some recent work in HCI does align with some of the concepts presented in 
this article. In particular, Dag Svanæs offers the concept of the feel dimension of 
interaction gestalts to describe user experience, inspired by philosopher Maurice 
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Merleau-Ponty’s view of perception as an interactive, whole body experience. 
Svanæs also discusses the importance of movement and the kinaesthetic sense for 
creativity in the design process.69 In the context of performing arts, David Kirsh 
studied the way expert dancers learn new dance phrases. He found that the imper-
fect simulation of new phrases—a process called marking—is a better method of 
practicing than performing complete phrases.70 He likens this to the creation of a 
model or sketch. The notion that incomplete, analogue and gestalt representations 
are better for learning complex dance phrases resonates with our understanding 
of sketches and prototypes as representations of the implicit dimension of ex-
perience. At the same time, Kirsh draws some of his views on perception from a 
different stream of embodied cognition than the one we have discussed. The finer 
points of this are beyond the scope of this article but would be worth exploring in 
future research. Some connections have also been made between the burgeoning 
interdisciplinary field of somaesthetics and HCI.71 These interdisciplinary connec-
tions are fascinating and full of potential for further exploration, theoretically and 
empirically. 
More broadly, a move beyond dualisms of objective and subjective, which 
necessitates dialectical thinking, is underway in many disciplines. This context is 
a theoretical movement, which philosopher Arran Gare terms “speculative natu-
ralism.”72 Design thinking benefits from being situated in existing, well-developed 
theories, as already suggested by some.73 Today’s complex problems demand an 
understanding of human creativity that does not privilege any one discipline but 
explores the potential contribution of specific skills and paradigms. The fact that 
design thinking de-politicizes design for management74 is a problem. Humanity 
is currently facing genuinely complex problems. To even begin to solve these, we 
need to stop the jostling for position in pre-set economic agendas and seek possibil-
ities for change inherent in our common humanity. 
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It is no accident that the word “sense” appears in the 
expression “making sense.” We traditionally interpret 
making sense as an activity that largely occurs in the 
mind. This is because the phrase is a metaphor, and 
like most metaphors, we instantly and uncritically 
associate it with a meaning. Upon careful inspection, 
the phrase betrays the bodily origins of thinking 
and reasoning which are—in embodied accounts of 
cognition—grounded in the senses. While embodied 
cognition is a relatively recent addition to academic 
dialogue,1 the language we use to describe cognition 
suggests that we have always known that the senses 
are involved in thinking and reasoning about the 
world. 
The stated goal of Karin Lindgaard and Heico 
Wesselius’s article2 is to make sense of design thinking 
by bringing the senses back into the understanding of 
how designers think and reason during design activity.
To achieve this, the authors begin by introducing 
several key ideas from an embodied account of cogni-
tion. They introduce sense making processes including 
metaphor theory, visual gestalts, and felt experience, 
and suggest that these processes may be foundational 
in designers’ material practices. They situate their 
work as fitting into the academic discourse about 
design thinking as a cognitive style, as articulated by 
Lucy Kimbell, and take a stance on design activity as 
reflective practice as articulated by Donald Schön. The 
authors state that their contribution is “suggestive 
